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We examine the joint effect of bidder and target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the
payment consideration and subsequent wealth effects in a large sample of acquisitions with both
listed and private targets. In line with a risk-sharing argument, we find that acquisitions of targets
characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock. In contrast, higher
target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of a cash payment, consistent with bidders
strategically exploiting superior information. Acquirers of more opaque targets obtain a larger
fraction of total acquisition gains and avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders by
offering cash.
It has been documented in the finance literature that the extent of information asymmetry
and uncertainty in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) strongly affects deal attributes, as well as
the wealth generated by both parties (Hansen, 1987; Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino, and
Heinkel, 1990; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007; Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan,
2009; Officer, Poulsen, and Stegemoller, 2009). In the specific context of M&A negotiation, a
double-sided information problem arises as both the bidder and the target are uncertain about the
other’s value. The return realized by the acquiring company depends upon an accurate assessment
of the target value and the accompanying synergistic effects. Similarly, the wealth effect for
target shareholders in stock transactions is contingent upon the acquirer value and the potential
synergistic gains.
In this paper, we distinguish between information asymmetry and uncertainty as two distinct
concepts. Information asymmetry relates to the extent of information availability. During an
extensive due diligence process, the bidder is able to gather superior information about the target
implying that the extent of information asymmetry is not equal across all market participants.
As such, the bidder is likely to strategically exploit this information advantage during the M&A
negotiation process. Uncertainty, in contrast, relates to the volatility of a firm’s underlying
fundamentals, which is symmetric across market participants and cannot be reduced regardless
of effort. Thus, uncertainty complicates a correct value assessment by all market participants.
We investigate the economic channels through which target and bidder information asymmetry
and uncertainty jointly affect the method of payment and subsequent wealth effects in M&As.
The first channel includes protection against overpayment resulting from adverse selection by
We thank Raghavendra Rau (editor) and an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. We also thank Evy Bruyland,
Katrien Craninckx, Wouter De Maeseneire, Denis Gromb, Nikolaos Karampatsas, Andrew Karolyi, Diana Knyazeva,
Pascal Maenhout, Massimo Massa, Bill Megginson, Urs Peyer, Christophe Spaenjers, Karin Thorburn, and participants
in the Annual Conference of the Midwest Finance Association (March 2013, Chicago) and the European Financial
Management Association (June 2013, Reading) for useful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
∗Mathieu Luypaert is an Associate Professor at Vlerick Business School, Ghent, Belgium. Tom Van Caneghem is an
Associate Professor at KU Leuven and Universiteit Antwerpen, Brussels, Belgium.
Financial Management • Winter 2017 • pages 873 – 917
874 Financial Management  Winter 2017
offering stock making the value of the offer contingent upon market reactions (Hansen, 1987).
A second driver relates to the strategic use of superior information by the bidder on the target
company compared to other market participants (cf. supra). Bidders might strategically exploit
the resulting superior bargaining position by imposing their preferred method of payment (cash)
to attract a larger fraction of total M&A gains. Bruner (2004) refers to private information as
the “sweet spot” for acquirers and relates it to lower competition, more advantageous pricing,
and better opportunities for deal tailoring. In addition, bidders, who have private information
concerning their own value, may try to benefit from this information advantage by offering stock
when they are overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004).
McSweeney (2012) explicitly refers to the decision to use stock payments in M&As as a trade-off
between reducing the downside for bidding companies of overvaluing targets and increasing the
extent of information asymmetry and uncertainty for targets in assessing the offered price.
In a sample of US M&A deals consisting of 1,725 listed and 1,810 private targets initiated
by publicly quoted acquirers from 1994 to 2011 and using a variety of information asymmetry
proxies (analyst coverage, analyst forecast properties, media coverage, listing status, firm size,
as well as compound indices), we find evidence consistent with bidders strategically exploiting
their superior bargaining power (resulting from superior information gathered during the due
diligence process) to attract a larger fraction of M&A gains. That is, we find that more opaque
targets have a greater likelihood to be offered cash payments. In addition, acquirers earn higher
abnormal returns and a larger fraction of total M&A gains if the target is characterized by higher
information asymmetry. Thus, to avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders, bidders are
more likely to opt for cash payments if the target is more opaque.
In contrast, targets with a value that is more uncertain to all market participants (proxied
by implied volatility, idiosyncratic return volatility, as well as a compound index), are more
likely to receive stock offers. As mentioned earlier, offering stock allows the bidder to share the
risk of overpayment (that might result from uncertainty) with target shareholders. We further
demonstrate that bidders characterized by higher uncertainty and information asymmetry are
more likely to engage in market-timing behavior through a higher incidence of stock swaps. In
the literature, several arguments have been advanced to explain a target’s willingness to accept
(overvalued) stock. For example, bidders can explicitly pay a target’s top management for their
consent (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004), targets can overestimate the value of synergistic
benefits in an overvalued market (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004), or selling shareholders
may prefer to postpone taxes on capital gains through stock offers (Brown and Ryngaert, 1991).
It is interesting to note that our results also indicate that the previously noted negative stock price
reaction upon stock swaps (Travlos, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987) is further strengthened by
bidder information asymmetry and uncertainty. This finding indicates that investors recognize
the opportunities for bidders to exploit temporary overvaluation. When dividing our sample in
two-way terciles in terms of bidder and target information asymmetry (uncertainty), we find that
the impact of bidder and target opacity and uncertainty act together. For example, when focusing
on the effect of information asymmetry, we confirm that the likelihood of a cash payment is
highest if the target is located in the top tercile (highest information asymmetry), while the bidder
is located in the bottom tercile (lowest information asymmetry).
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we focus on the joint
impact of both sides of the double-sided information problem in M&As, while the prior literature
typically considers only one side of the problem, either the target (Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino,
2004; Officer et al., 2009) or the bidder (Travlos, 1987; Moeller et al., 2007; Lin, Pantzalis, and
Park 2009; Duchin and Schmidt, 2013). Chemmanur et al. (2009), who focus on the trade-off
between the risk of overpayment and the probability of an unsuccessful bid, provide a notable
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exception. They find that cash payments deter competing offers in a setting of proprietary target
information, but only in models where they consider both target and bidder private information.
Their findings illustrate the need for considering both sides of the information problem (i.e.,
considering only one side may bias findings). In addition, we make a clear distinction between
information asymmetry and uncertainty, and demonstrate that they have different effects on the
method of payment and the wealth effects in M&As. Moreover, prior studies typically ignore the
second economic channel (i.e., the strategic use of superior information by the bidder), which
requires a careful analysis of the division of gains between both parties. While some studies have
analyzed the distribution of M&A wealth effects between bidders and targets (Bauguess et al.,
2009; Ahern, 2012), they fail to consider the effect of uncertainty and information asymmetry
between both parties. Our study fills this void in the literature.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section I, we discuss the prior literature
and develop our hypotheses. Our sample and methodology are introduced in Section II. In
Section III, we present and discuss our results. Finally, we summarize our main conclusions in
Section IV.
I. Hypotheses
M&As represent a unique setting to examine the role of information asymmetry and uncertainty
and their effect on the bidder’s and target’s value. The quality and quantity of the information
available to both parties are likely to influence important choices relating to the type of bid, the
offer premium, and the means of payment (Raman, Shivakumar, and Tamayo, 2013). In addition,
investors’ reactions upon the deal announcement will reflect frictions, as well as value-creating
opportunities resulting from either inferior or superior information on the counterparty.
In this section, we present our hypotheses as to how the aforementioned double-sided problem
of asymmetric information and uncertainty influences payment methods and acquirer (relative)
returns, building upon three different economic channels. First, we analyze target opacity and
how bidders could protect against overpayment by offering stock payments. In addition, we fo-
cus on the strategic exploitation of superior information obtained by bidding firms about the
target’s value compared to other market participants. Next, we consider uncertainty and private
information about the bidder’s value and investigate the potential use of relatively overvalued
stock to pay for their target companies. An overview of the different hypotheses and the prox-
ies used to capture target and acquirer information asymmetry and uncertainty is presented in
Table I.
A. Target Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty
In his seminal paper, Hansen (1987) argues that a lemons problem arises in M&A transactions
when target companies possess proprietary information about their own value. The target is
expected to only accept an acquisition offer if the bidder offers more than the actual target
value. The bidding firm can protect itself against adverse selection by offering a payment in
stock as the value of such an offer is contingent upon market reactions between the M&A
announcement and the completion of the transaction (Fishman, 1989; Eckbo et al., 1990; Reuer
et al., 2004; Officer et al., 2009). In an efficient market, the stock price reaction will depend upon
investors’ expectations of future synergy realization. The acquirer’s stock price will drop if the
market considers the M&A to be a value-destroying decision, resulting in a lower offer for target
shareholders. As such, bidders can shift part of the risk about the target’s value through stock
offers.
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Table I. Overview Proxies and Hypotheses
This table presents the proxies used for target and acquirer information asymmetry and uncertainty and their
hypothesized effect on the likelihood of cash payments, acquirer CAR over the window [–1, +1], and the
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These desirable contingent-pricing characteristics are expected to matter, especially in settings
characterized by greater information asymmetry and uncertainty. Hansen (1987) predicts that
the impact of information asymmetry and the contingent pricing effect of a stock offer to be
higher if the target is relatively larger compared to the acquirer. Supportive findings for this
prediction have been presented by Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Martynova and Renneboog
(2009), among others. Reuer et al. (2004) examine the role of contingent payments in international
M&As and find that firms lacking acquisition experience typically opt for contingent payments
when purchasing targets in industries that are more difficult to value (e.g., high tech).
The contingent-pricing arguments suggest that acquiring companies will avoid cash offers when
targets are more challenging to value correctly. This is reflected in the following hypothesis:
H1: Acquiring firms are less inclined to opt for cash payments if targets are characterized by
higher information asymmetry and/or uncertainty.
Additionally, the extent and quality of public information regarding the target’s value is also
likely to affect its bargaining position in M&A transactions. A lack of investor cognizance
could cause stocks to trade below their fundamental value resulting in inferior negotiating power
(Brennan and Subrahmanyan, 1995; Chung and Jo, 1996; Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis, 2005;
Barber and Odean, 2008; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). Firms interested in acquiring a target
obtain superior information during an extensive due diligence process. As part of the negotiation
process, the target’s management is likely to allow bidders to access management accounts and
other inside information (Raman et al., 2013). The information gap between these informed
bidders and other market participants is expected to be larger when targets are more opaque.
In addition, the potential information asymmetry in the market implies the existence of a first-
mover advantage thereby reducing the likelihood of competing offers (Bruner, 2004). This creates
a relatively stronger negotiation position that can be exploited by the informed bidder through
lower offer prices leading to higher abnormal acquirer returns around the M&A announcement.
In a similar vein, Capron and Shen (2007) argue that limited information on private firms,
compared to publicly quoted firms, generates more value creating opportunities for exploiting
private information. In line with our arguments, they find that bidders prefer low information
asymmetry vis-à-vis targets, but high information asymmetry vis-à-vis competing bidders in
order to fully benefit from the private information advantage. Mantecon (2008) confirms that
acquiring firms gain when acquiring private firms because of the private target’s relatively weaker
bargaining position due to informational and agency problems and costly access to external
capital.
This reasoning does not necessarily mean that targets characterized by higher information
asymmetry will realize lower premia upon deal announcement. While takeover prices might be
below those of more transparent targets, the difference between the offer price and the stand-
alone value of the targets (i.e., the premium) might be at the same level or even higher due to the
relatively low stand-alone value of the opaque targets prior to the M&A. This explains why targets
are likely to accept these offers. Accordingly, the M&A might constitute a value creating strategy
for both the bidder and the target, but the stronger bargaining position should allow acquirers to
obtain a larger fraction of total M&A gains.
Rational bidders should try to avoid sharing the incremental gains with target shareholders.
This can be achieved by offering fixed cash offers. The cost of such an offer is independent of the
investor’s reaction upon the deal announcement. Thus, the additional gains from a more positive
assessment of the M&A by the market will not have to be shared with the target shareholders.
Alternatively, in stock swaps, the total amount paid to the target shareholders will be higher if
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the acquirer investors react more positively to the announced transaction. Therefore, we expect
bidders to offer cash payments, especially when the value to other outside investors is less visible.
As these arguments are built specifically upon the notion of the asymmetric distribution of
information between the more informed bidding company and other market participants (instead
of symmetric uncertainty), our second hypothesis solely refers to the impact of information
asymmetry. The aforementioned considerations lead to the following predictions:
H2a: Acquiring firms are more inclined to opt for cash payments if the targets are characterized
by higher information asymmetry.
H2b: Acquirers realize higher returns upon announcement of acquisitions of targets characterized
by higher information asymmetry.
H2c: Acquirers earn a larger fraction of total M&A gains if the targets are characterized by
higher information asymmetry.
B. Acquirer Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty
In addition to target opacity, information asymmetry and uncertainty concerning the acquirer’s
value could also drive the payment consideration as it offers opportunities to exploit short-
term overvaluation. Several authors provide evidence of such market-timing behavior in firms’
financing decisions (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Graham
and Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006). A key ingredient
to exploiting misvaluation is the existence of differences in the information sets of managers and
financial markets concerning the value of the firm (Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006). Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) develop a theoretical model of M&As under the assumption that managers
act rational, understand stock market inefficiencies, and take advantage of them. They argue
that overvalued acquirers try to benefit from short-term overvaluation of their shares by buying
relatively less overvalued targets in stock paid transactions. Empirical findings by Dong et al.
(2006) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) confirm the theoretical prediction
that overvaluation is an important motive for firms in making stock acquisitions. Temporary
deviations of stock prices from their fundamental values are more likely the greater the volatility
of stock prices, and hence uncertainty, and the extent of asymmetric information (Zhang, 2006;
Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Thus, we expect to observe more stock transactions if the acquirer’s
value is more unclear/uncertain to outside investors.
Several arguments have been advanced to explain a target’s willingness to accept overvalued
acquirer stock. First, bidders can explicitly pay a target’s top management for their consent.
These benefits could take the form of either increased financial wealth or attractive positions in
the newly combined company (Hartzell et al., 2004). As such, the target’s management could
compromise the interests of their own shareholders in pursuit of these benefits. In addition,
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) model a target’s behavior and illustrate that targets are
likely to accept overvalued stock offers as they tend to overestimate the value of synergistic
benefits in an overvalued market. Brown and Ryngaert (1991) argue that selling shareholders can
postpone taxes on capital gains through stock offers, while the shares swapped are valued by the
target as if they were offered by the average bidder.
This market-timing behavior of the acquirers is likely to affect investors’ reactions upon the
deal announcement. By offering a stock payment, managers of the acquiring firms signal to
the market that they are overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Consequently, several studies
provide evidence of fewer acquirer announcements, as well as long-term returns in M&As paid
for with stock (Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). However, the argument of temporary
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stock market overvaluation rests on the assumptions of asymmetric information and uncertainty.
Thus, we expect to observe a stronger negative reaction of investors to the announcement of
stock offers initiated by more opaque acquirers. Consistent with this prediction, Moeller et al.
(2007) find that acquirer abnormal returns are negatively related to information asymmetry and
diversity-of-opinion proxies for stock offers, but not for cash offers. Following the above outlined
arguments, we conjecture the following:
H3a: Acquirers are more inclined to opt for stock payments if they are characterized by higher
information asymmetry and/or uncertainty.
H3b: The negative impact of stock payments on acquirer announcement returns is aggravated
by greater acquirer information asymmetry and/or uncertainty.
II. Sample and Methodology
A. Sample
Using the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database, we select a sample of M&As between
two publicly quoted US firms from 1994 to 2011. Our sample period captures the M&A waves
of the second half of the 1990s and that of the mid-2000s. We impose the following selection
criteria to obtain our final sample. First, we only consider deals with a real change in control over
the target’s resources. Thus, the total stake that the bidder wishes to achieve in the target post-
M&A must exceed 50% for the deal to be retained in our sample. Furthermore, we drop all deals
where the bidding firm already owned 50% of the target stock prior to the M&A announcement
date. In addition, we exclude all financial firms (i.e., primary standard industrial classification
[SIC] code starting with 6). Additionally, we only include deals where the method of payment is
captured by the SDC (cash, stock, or a combination of both). Finally, we require both the target
and the acquirer to have accounting and stock price data available on Compustat and Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), respectively. These selection criteria leave us with a sample
of 1,725 M&As.
Next, we construct a second sample of acquisitions of private targets by listed bidders. We
impose exactly the same selection criteria and only include private targets with a known deal
value on SDC. This results in an additional sample of 1,810 acquisitions.
The deal characteristics of our sample are presented in Table II. We find that 85.33% (94.81%)
of all announced acquisitions of public (private) targets in our sample are completed. We further
determine that 23.65% of all public-public transactions are characterized as tender offers, 8.06%
were opposed by target management (i.e., hostile offers), and 8.75% were countered by a rival
offer. Not surprisingly, tender offers (0.28%), hostile M&As (0.06%), and deals with rival offers
(0.39%) only represent a marginal fraction of acquisitions of private targets. Table II also reveals
that 39.07% (34.14%) of public (private) targets operate in the same industry as their acquirer
(four-digit SIC codes). Finally, 42.32% of all public-public M&As are compensated with cash,
while 34.03% are pure stock offers. Thus, 23.65% of public-public M&As are paid with a
combination of different instruments. In the sample of private targets, 46.35% are stock offers,
24.64% are mixed payments, and 29.01% are pure cash payments.
B. Empirical Proxies for Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty
The ambiguity of investors with respect to a firm’s value might stem from two important sources
(Zhang, 2006; Lu, Chen, and Liao, 2010). First, the extent of information availability determines
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the ease and quality of company valuation. If information is asymmetrically distributed over
market participants, adverse selection costs can arise and superior information can be strategically
exploited. These differences can exist between insiders and outsiders of the firm, as well as
between different outside market participants. In addition, the volatility, and uncertainty, of a
firm’s underlying fundamentals complicates a correct value assessment by all participants in the
market. The remainder of this section describes the empirical proxies that we use to capture these
distinct concepts.
We first present our proxies for information asymmetry. As there is no single comprehensive
measure of information asymmetry, we analyze multiple proxies that have been used extensively
in the prior literature. We begin by examining the impact of analyst coverage. Financial analysts
synthesize and aggregate complex information that would not otherwise be easily understandable
to less sophisticated investors (Chang et al., 2006). Moreover, they collect information that is not
widely known by market participants and disseminate this information to investors through the
publication of reports containing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. Consistent with
financial analysts adding value in the market by reducing information asymmetry, empirical re-
search has shown that higher analyst coverage leads to a more rapid incorporation of information
in stock prices (Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993), higher liquidity (Brennan and Sub-
rahmanyan, 1995; Irvine, 2003), a lower cost of raising equity capital (Bowen, Chen, and Cheng,
2008), and less earnings management (Yu, 2008). In addition, Mola, Raghavendra, and Khorana
(2013) illustrate that financial analysts play an important role in bringing covered stocks to the
attention of investors. Limited investor attention could cause stocks to trade below their fun-
damental value leading to inferior negotiating power in M&A transactions (Barber and Odean,
2008; Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). We use the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
database to determine the number of analyst recommendations for the last month of the fiscal
year preceding the M&A announcement. In line with Chang et al. (2006) and Yu (2008), among
others, we assume that firms that are not covered by I/B/E/S have no analyst coverage (analyst
coverage is equal to zero). We calculate relative analyst coverage by normalizing the number of
analyst recommendations by firm size and include its inverse in our regression models.
The quality of the information provided by financial analysts may also play an important
role. We capture the informativeness of analyst forecasts using two proxies. First, we consider
analyst forecast error by determining the absolute value of the difference between the median
earnings-per-share (EPS) estimate by analysts during the final month of the year preceding the
M&A announcement and its actual value scaled by the stock price. In addition, we compute
the dispersion in analyst forecasts as the standard deviation in analyst EPS estimates scaled
by the firm’s stock price.1 Since disagreement among analysts can be induced by a lack of
publicly available information about the firm, it has been widely used in prior research as a proxy
for information asymmetry (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999; Chemmanur et al., 2009;
Chatterjee, John, and Yan, 2012).2
We use media coverage as a fourth measure of asymmetric information. The media serves as one
of the most important channels through which information is disseminated to potential investors.
Press coverage is found to drive trading, alleviate informational frictions, and affect security
1 Consequently, this measure can only be calculated for firms followed by at least two financial analysts.
2 However, one criticism of analyst dispersion as a measure of information asymmetry is that dispersion among analysts
might be high even though all market participants are well informed due to more volatile earnings and differing beliefs
among market participants about the firm’s future performance (Barron et al. 1998). Nevertheless, our empirical results
regarding target analyst dispersion, presented in Section III, are more in line with the other proxies of information
asymmetry rather than uncertainty.
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pricing (Barber and Odean, 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Tetlock, 2010). We hand collected data
on media coverage through the Factiva database. We follow Ahern and Sosyura (2014) by using
the number of articles in all English language media sources included in Factiva’s category of
major news and business publications in the year preceding the acquisition announcement. This
includes a large number of publications, such as USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The New
York Times, and many others. To be sure that we count substantive articles, we eliminate articles
with fewer than 50 words and articles categorized by Factiva as recurring pricing and market data.
Similarly to analyst coverage, we also normalize media coverage by firm size and consider its
inverse.
A fifth measure capturing asymmetric information is the listing status of the target company.
One of the crucial differences between private and public firm acquisitions is the quantity and
quality of information available on the target company (Capron and Shen, 2007; Mantecon, 2008;
Officer et al., 2009). Enhanced disclosure requirements, greater investor attention, scrutiny by
financial analysts, and larger media coverage make public targets considerably less opaque than
private targets.
Finally, as larger firms are generally more visible and less informationally opaque compared
to smaller firms, we also consider firm size to be a proxy for information availability. We capture
size by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Next to target and bidder absolute size, we
also include the relative size of the target compared to the bidder in all models.
Next, we consider two measures of uncertainty. First, we analyze the impact of implied volatility.
This is a forward-looking risk measure reflecting the future volatility of returns over the remaining
lifetime of an option. Following Bargeron et al. (2014) and Duchin and Schmidt (2013), we
collect standardized implied option volatilities of 91-day at-the-money (ATM) options from the
estimated volatility surface in the Optionmetrics database. We consider the average implied
volatility of ATM call and ATM put options and avoid the effects of information leakage prior
the M&A announcement by focusing on the median daily implied volatility from 80 days to 51
days before the acquisition announcement (i.e., final 30 trading days of the estimation period
in the event study). Because coverage of Optionmetrics starts in 1996, our sample period is
restricted for this additional proxy. We were able to collect acquirer implied volatility data for
850 transactions, while target implied volatility is known for only 641 transactions. A second
proxy that we employ is the idiosyncratic return volatility of the target and the acquirer measured
as the standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals of daily stock returns during a 200-
day estimation window (i.e., 250 days until 51 days before the announcement). This volatility
measure has the advantage of only capturing firm-specific risk factors and has been applied
before by Officer et al. (2009) to proxy for the difficulty of valuation of target companies in M&A
transactions.
Additionally, we construct composite indices of asymmetric information and uncertainty ag-
gregating the aforementioned proxies (Lin et al., 2009). We normalize each of the individual
measures and compute their average value. We consider two indices capturing information asym-
metry. The first index is calculated based upon the inverse of analyst coverage, analyst forecast
dispersion, analyst forecast error, and the inverse of media coverage. A second asymmetric in-
formation index also incorporates the inverse of firm size next to all of the measures included in
the first index. Finally, we compute an index measuring uncertainty based upon both implied and
idiosyncratic volatility.
Table III provides an overview of the descriptive statistics on target and acquirer characteristics
including our asymmetric information and uncertainty proxies. Analyst coverage in our sample
is found to be significantly higher for acquirers when compared to targets. The average (median)
number of analysts following acquirers is 10.31 (8.00), while it is 5.08 (3.00) for the target firms.
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Differences in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast errors are only found to be significant
when looking at medians. The average (median) number of articles in the pre-M&A year is
352.99 for acquirers and only 25.66 for targets. Implied volatility is found to be higher for targets
(average of 57.26%) compared to acquirers (46.22%). The same holds for idiosyncratic stock
return volatility (4.21% vs. 3.05%). Not surprisingly, acquirers are significantly larger than their
targets, both in terms of total assets, as well as market capitalization. Table III further reports
that the median bidder’s market-to-book ratio of equity (2.98) in the public-public sample lies
significantly above that of their targets (2.05), while the difference in the average market-to-book
ratios is not significant. We also find that acquirers typically have lower cash levels, more debt,
higher profitability, and less research and development (R&D) expenses than their targets. When
compared with the subsample of public-private deals, we determine that acquirers of private
targets are typically smaller than those of public targets, have higher market-to-book ratios, cash
levels, and R&D expenses, and lower debt and profitability levels.
III. Results
In this section, we discuss our empirical results. We start by analyzing the antecedents of
the M&A payment choice and focus on the relative strength of target and acquirer opacity in
jointly determining the type of payment. Next, we explore the role of information asymmetry
and uncertainty in determining acquirer abnormal returns, as well as the division of M&A gains
between targets and acquirers.
A. Choice of Payment Consideration
The binary probit regression models in Table IV investigate the determinants of the likelihood
of fixed cash offers versus offers that are at least partly compensated with stock (i.e., full stock and
mixed payments). The dependent variable is equal to one if the bidder offers an all cash payment
and zero otherwise. We focus on the explanatory role of information asymmetry on both the target
and the acquirer (with regard to testing H1 and H2a). We estimate separate regression models
for each proxy of information asymmetry and control for target and acquirer size, as well as the
relative size of the target versus the acquirer.3 In addition, we add several control variables that
have been shown to determine the M&A payment choice in the prior literature. The type of deal
is controlled for by including dummy variables capturing whether it is a tender, a hostile, or an
industry-related offer (at the four-digit SIC level), respectively. We also take into account acquirer
toeholds in the target prior to the acquisition announcement. Next, we include several target and
acquirer characteristics that may be linked to the underlying financing decision. While stock
payments generally imply the issuance of new shares (or using shares in treasury), cash offers are
more likely to be financed with available cash reserves or new loans (Harford, Klasa, and Walcott,
2009; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). In particular, we take into account the target’s and the
bidder’s market-to-book ratio of equity, the cash ratio, the debt ratio, profitability, and R&D
intensity. Following Ahern (2012), we also account for relative scarcity by including industry
value added and industry variability of profitability. This allows us to distinguish between the
effects of information asymmetry (i.e., the focus of our paper) and relative scarcity. Industry value
3 Target and bidder size are included in all of the regressions except for the models using the information asymmetry
index 2 as size has been incorporated as one of the components of that index. Target size is not separately controlled for
in the regression with the private target dummy as the value of total assets for the private targets is not known.
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added is captured through the Use and Make tables provided by the US Bureau of Economic
analysis (BEA).4 Specifically, we divide the value added by each industry by its total output.
For this purpose, we convert six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
codes provided by SDC to IO industry codes using the concordance tables provided by the
BEA. Variability of profitability within the industry is calculated as the standard deviation of
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)/total assets in the target’s
and the acquirer’s four-digit SIC industry. Finally, we add year dummies in all of our models.
A check of the correlations among the various explanatory variables reveals that none are too
highly correlated (pairwise correlations do not exceed 0.5). The variance inflation factors never
surpass five. All regressions are run using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard
errors. A detailed summary of the definitions of all of the explanatory variables can be found in
Appendix A.
The results in Table IV reject the predictions regarding information asymmetry in H1, but are
consistent with H2a. We find that M&As of targets characterized by higher information asymme-
try are more likely to be all cash offers. The coefficients of all asymmetric information proxies
are significantly positive, except for the inverse of media coverage. In addition, smaller targets
are typically settled through cash offers. These findings suggest that higher target information
asymmetry increases the acquirer’s bargaining power in the M&A process, which is likely to
result in higher expected value creation around the deal announcement. Consequently, bidders
will be more inclined to opt for fixed cash payments. The impact of information asymmetry in
explaining acquirer wealth effects will be investigated in detail in Section III.B. In line with our
theoretical predictions, H2a only holds for the proxies of information asymmetry. The measures
of uncertainty are found to negatively affect the likelihood of cash payments. This finding does
support H1 and illustrates that stock payments could resolve the acquirer’s concerns when un-
certainty about the target’s value is high by sharing the risk with the target shareholders. In this
respect, our findings confirm the conclusions of Officer et al. (2009). However, the contribution
of our findings is that we demonstrate opposite effects when considering asymmetric information
instead of symmetric uncertainty.
Consistent with H3, acquirers with a more uncertain value are more likely to opt for stock
payments. The coefficients of all acquirer uncertainty measures are negative and highly significant
(at the 1% level). The second composite acquirer information asymmetry index and analyst
forecast dispersion also have a significantly negative effect on the probability of cash offers.5
In addition, larger acquirers are more likely to pay in cash. In sum, these findings suggest that
higher information asymmetry and uncertainty about the bidder’s value increase the opportunities
to exploit relative overvaluation in the market by offering stock payments.
Concerning the control variables, we find that cash payments are more likely in tender offers and
hostile offers. Offering cash increases the probability of acceptance in these types of transactions
(Martin, 1996; Faccio and Masulis, 2005). The likelihood of stock offers is found to be greater
in industry-related transactions. Taking into account shareholder investment preferences, target
shareholders may be more inclined to invest in the shares of the newly combined firm and,
as such, to accept stock offers if the acquiring firm is operating in the same industry as the
target firm. Many studies provide evidence of an increased probability of stock payments in
4 As these reports are produced each five years, we choose to work with the 2002 report, splitting our sample period
roughly in half.
5 Surprisingly and in contrast to our other proxies for information asymmetry and uncertainty, we observe a significantly
positive coefficient of acquirer analyst forecast error on the likelihood of cash payment. This suggests that a higher
forecast error by analysts does not increase the likelihood of market-timing behavior.
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industry-related M&As (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Acquirer toeholds are negatively related to
the use of cash payments. This is in line with stock being used when target uncertainty is lower.
Regarding the firm characteristics, we find that bidders with high market-to-book ratios tend to
pay with shares, while high acquirer profitability incites more cash offers. The level of acquirer
R&D expenses has a negative impact on the likelihood of cash payments, which is consistent
with acquirers preferring stock payments if their own value is more uncertain. We further note
that cash offers are more likely to occur if value added in the target industry and the standard
deviation of profitability in the acquirer’s industry are low.
In addition, we examine the robustness of our results by estimating alternative regression
models (see Appendix B). First, we estimate logit, instead of binary, probit regression models
(Columns 1–3). In addition, we analyze ordered probit models where the dependent variable is
equal to zero for all-stock offers, one for mixed offers, and two for all-cash offers (Columns
4–6). Finally, we estimate the ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with the fraction of cash
in the total price offered as the dependent variable (Columns 7–9).6 The results in Appendix B
confirm our earlier findings demonstrating that the likelihood of full cash payments, as well as the
fraction of cash in the total payment consideration are higher in acquisitions of informationally
more opaque and less uncertain targets. Acquirers are more inclined to opt for a higher fraction
of stock if they are affected by higher information asymmetry and uncertainty.
In Table V, we investigate the relative strength of target and acquirer information asymmetry
and uncertainty in determining the likelihood of cash payments by dividing the sample in two-
way terciles. The split in asymmetric information terciles is based upon the second information
asymmetry index (i.e., including all proxies). The univariate results in Panel A indicate that the
fraction of full cash payments in acquisitions of targets in the top tercile of information asymmetry
by acquirers in the bottom tercile is 62.90%. This percentage drops to only 31.43% in the opposite
situation. If both the target and the acquirer are in the highest tercile, we observe 37.91% cash
offers. Finally, the fraction of cash offers if both firms are part of the bottom tercile is 49.38%.
We also investigate the joint impact of both forces by including four dummy variables in our
multivariate regression models. These dummy variables capture the combined presence of targets
and acquirers in the top and bottom terciles of information asymmetry. The results in Panel B
of Table V reveal that the likelihood of cash payments is significantly higher if the targets are
characterized by high and bidders by low information asymmetry. These results provide support
for H2a and H3 and illustrate that both forces act together.
When dividing the sample based upon the uncertainty index, we find the lowest fraction of cash-
paid transactions (16.47%) if the target’s and the acquirer’s uncertainty is high. The multivariate
results confirm that the probability of cash payments is significantly higher (lower) if the value of
both firms is more (less) uncertain. These results imply that acquirers prefer to share risk through
stock offers if target uncertainty is high (supporting H1). In addition, bidders are more inclined
to exploit overvaluation of their stock when their value is more uncertain (in line with H3). These
results confirm that both drivers act jointly and do not offset each other.
B. Acquirer Abnormal Returns
We apply the event study methodology to analyze shareholder value that is created through
the M&As in our sample. Abnormal acquirer and target returns are computed as the difference
between realized returns and expected returns. Expected returns are calculated using the market
6 The exact fraction of cash in the total offer price is known for 845 of 922 deals for which the asymmetric information
indices are available and for 335 of 402 deals with a known uncertainty index for both parties.
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Table V. Choice of Payment Consideration: Two-Way Terciles
Panel A of this table presents the fraction of transactions paid in cash for the top and bottom terciles
of target and acquirer information asymmetry and uncertainty. The allocation is based on the second
information asymmetry index (the composite index including the inverse of normalized relative ana-
lyst coverage, normalized analyst forecast dispersion, normalized analyst forecast error, the inverse of
normalized relative media coverage, and normalized firm size) and the uncertainty index (composite index
including implied and idiosyncratic stock return volatility). Panel B of this table reports the results of a
binary probit regression where the dependent variable is equal to one in the case of a cash offer. Four dummy
variables are considered as explanatory variables capturing whether the target and the bidder are in the
bottom or top terciles according to the second information asymmetry index (composite index including
the inverse of normalized relative analyst coverage, normalized analyst forecast dispersion, normalized
analyst forecast error, the inverse of normalized relative media coverage, and normalized firm size) and
the uncertainty index (composite index including implied and idiosyncratic stock return volatility). The
control variables include the relative size of the target versus the bidder, dummies capturing whether it is a
tender, a hostile, or an industry-related offer, respectively (at the four-digit SIC level), the acquirer’s toehold
in the target, the target’s and the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio of equity, the cash ratio (cash and cash
equivalents/total assets), the debt ratio (total debt/total assets), profitability (EBITDA/total assets), R&D
(R&D expenses/total assets), industry value added (value added/total output), and the standard deviation
of profitability in the target’s and the acquirer’s industry. t-Statistics are calculated using White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. p-values are reported in parentheses.
Panel A. Univariate Results
Acquirer information asymmetryFraction of
transactions paid
in cash HIGH (TOP T) LOW (BOTTOM T)
Target information
asymmetry
HIGH (TOP T) 37.91% 62.90%
LOW (BOTTOM T) 31.43% 49.38%
p-value for difference
Target high/acquirer high versus target low/acquirer low 0.041
Target low/acquirer high versus target high/acquirer low 0.003
Acquirer uncertainty
HIGH (TOP T) LOW (BOTTOM T)
Target uncertainty HIGH (TOP T) 16.47% 64.29%
LOW (BOTTOM T) 50.00% 55.05%
p-value for difference
Target high/acquirer high vs. target low/acquirer low 0.000
Target low/acquirer high vs. target high/acquirer low 0.719
Panel B. Multivariate Results




Dummy target low (T) and acquirer low (T) 0.120 0.534∗∗
(0.441) (0.027)
(Continued)
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Table V. Choice of Payment Consideration: Two-Way Terciles (Continued)
Panel B. Multivariate Results
Binary probit regression (CASH = 1)
Asymmetric information Uncertainty
Dummy target low (T) and acquirer high (T) 0.180 −0.733
(0.605) (0.245)
Dummy target high (T) and acquirer low (T) 0.525∗∗ 0.435
(0.016) (0.436)
Dummy target high (T) and acquirer high (T) 0.228 −0.950∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.002)
(Control variables included)
Year dummies Yes Yes
N 922 402
Mc Fadden R2 0.429 0.489
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
model, which is estimated during a clean period [–250, –51] relative to the event date (Day 0).
We use the S&P 500 Index as the market index and study the significance of these abnormal
returns using the standard test developed by Dodd and Warner (1983). The average cumulative
abnormal returns over the event windows [–10, +10], [–5, +5], [–1, +1], and [–1, 0], as well as
the abnormal return on the event day itself, are presented in Panel A of Table VI. Consistent with
the prior literature (Chang, 1998; Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002), we find that bidding
firms realize small, but significantly negative abnormal returns when acquiring public targets,
while realizing positive returns at the announcement of private target acquisitions. These returns
amount to –1.68% and 1.75%, respectively, on average, over the three-day window surrounding the
announcement ([–1, +1]). The average target CAR (that can only be measured in public-public
M&As) is equal to 24.81% over the same window. The largest one-day shock for targets, as
well as acquirers, takes place on the announcement date itself. Over the long [–10, +10] window,
acquirers of public targets lose –2.53%, while those of private targets realize insignificant returns.
Target firms earn 29.60%, on average, over this longer window.
Table VII explores the driving factors of acquirer M&A gains through OLS regression models
where the dependent variable is equal to the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window
[–1, +1]. We include the same explanatory variables as in the previous models and add a dummy
capturing all stock payments, as well as the interaction between this dummy variable and our
proxies for acquirer information asymmetry and uncertainty. The results confirm the opposing
impact of target information asymmetry and uncertainty. Target information asymmetry (as
proxied by the second information asymmetry index, as well as by lower analyst coverage, private
status, and a smaller size) is found to positively affect acquirer returns. For example, bidder
returns in acquisitions of private targets are, on average, 3.7% higher compared to acquisitions
of public targets, ceteris paribus. This confirms H2a and suggests that acquisitions of targets
with high information asymmetry constitute a bargain relative to less opaque targets due to the
bidder’s information advantage vis-à-vis other market participants. In line with this argument,
the results in the previous section indicate that rational bidders will try to avoid sharing the extra
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Table VI. Acquirer and Target Gains
Panel A reports the acquirer and target cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over different windows sur-
rounding the M&A announcement date (Day 0). Expected returns are calculated using the market model,
which is estimated during a clean period [–250, –51] relative to the event date (Day 0). Panel B reports
the average acquirer relative return, as well as the fraction of gains accruing to acquirer shareholders over
different event windows. This panel only presents results for the sample of public targets as return data is
needed for both the target and the acquirer. The relative gain of the acquirer versus the target is calculated
as the difference in dollar gains between the acquirer and the target divided by the sum of the acquirer’s and
the target’s pre-M&A market value of equity. The fraction of acquirer gains is equal to the percentage of
total dollar gains accruing to acquirer shareholders. As the results would be misleading if the dollar returns
are negative for either or both firms, we calculate this fraction for the subsample where both firms realize
positive CARs.
Event window [0] [−1,0] [−1,+1] [−5,5] [−10,+10]
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Public-public transactions
Acquirer CAR (%) −1.36%∗∗∗ −1.33%∗∗∗ −1.68%∗∗∗ −2.02%∗∗∗ −2.53%∗∗∗
Target CAR (%) 17.02%∗∗∗ 18.55%∗∗∗ 24.81%∗∗∗ 32.10%∗∗∗ 29.60%∗∗∗
Public-private transactions
Acquirer CAR (%) 1.24%∗∗∗ 1.48%∗∗∗ 1.75%∗∗∗ 0.63% −0.63%
Panel B. Division of Gains
Average acquirer relative return −3.18%∗∗∗ −3.39%∗∗∗ −4.31%∗∗∗ −4.83%∗∗∗ −5.52%∗∗∗
(% positive) (31.13%) (30.26%) (28.17%) (44.41%) (44.48%)
Average acquirer fraction of gains 60.32% 60.11% 58.25% 61.87% 62.87%
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
gains with target shareholders by offering fixed cash payments. In contrast, shareholders seem
to react negatively when target uncertainty is high (as captured by both volatility measures and
the composite index). We find that an increase of one basis point in implied (idiosyncratic) target
volatility leads to 0.07% (0.28%) lower bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). This also
explains why acquirers do not tend to opt for fixed cash payments when the target’s value is more
uncertain.
Consistent with the prior literature, we find a significantly negative impact of stock swaps on
acquirer abnormal returns (Travlos, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987). As predicted (i.e., H3b),
this negative impact is found to be stronger for acquirers characterized by higher information
asymmetry and uncertainty. The impact of the interaction terms between our different proxies
and the all-stock dummy is significantly negative.7 Thus, investors react more negatively to the
announcement of stock swaps if the acquirers are more informationally opaque and their values
more uncertain. This finding suggests that investors recognize the opportunities for bidders to ex-
ploit temporary overvaluation. Our results support the earlier conclusions of Moeller et al. (2007)
who find that acquirer abnormal returns are negatively affected by information asymmetry and
diversity-of-opinion proxies for stock, but not for cash offers. Concerning the control variables,
7 Except for the interaction with analyst forecast error and dispersion.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Luypaert & Van Caneghem  Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in M&As 897
we find that tender offers result in higher acquirer abnormal returns, while cash ratios of both
firms have a significantly negative impact.
C. Division of Gains
We investigate the division of gains between the combining firms in two ways. First, following
Ahern (2012) and Bauguess et al. (2009), we use the difference in dollar gains between the bidder
and the target divided by the sum of the bidder’s and the target’s pre-M&A market value of
equity. Dollar gains are calculated by multiplying bidder and target abnormal returns with their
respective market capitalization at the end of the estimation window (i.e., 50 days prior to the
announcement day). As argued by Ahern (2012), this measure represents the relative gain of the
acquirer versus the target for each dollar of total market value. The average acquirer relative gain
is –4.31% over the window [–1, +1] suggesting that acquiring shareholders, on average, receive
a lower portion of the total gains than target shareholders, with the difference equal to 4.31% of
the combined market value (see Panel B of Table VI). Moreover, only 28.17% of all transactions
result in a positive relative acquirer return. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the other event
windows [–10, +10], [–5, +5], [–1, 0], and [0]. In addition, we measure the percentage of total
dollar gains accruing to the acquirer shareholders. Although the interpretation of this measure is
more straightforward, the results would be misleading if the dollar returns are negative for either
or both firms. Thus, we perform this robustness check for the subsample where both firms realize
positive CARs. This is the case for 661 of 1,725 deals. For this specific subsample, we find that
acquirer shareholders obtain 58.25% of the total value created through the M&A in the window
[–1, +1]. Therefore, targets typically realize 41.75% of the total dollar gains in the subsample
where the target and the bidder realize positive CARs. The fraction of acquirer gains is equal to
62.87%, 61.87%, 60.11%, and 60.32% for the event windows [–10, +10], [–5, +5], [–1, 0], and
[0], respectively. These figures are in line with the findings of Ahern (2012).
Table VIII reports the OLS regressions that examine the determinants of both the acquirer
relative returns (Panel A) and the fraction of total returns accruing to acquirer shareholders
(Panel B). We include the same proxies for information asymmetry and uncertainty, except for
the private target dummy as the division of gains cannot be measured in the case of private target
acquisitions. The results support the notion that information availability influences the negotiation
power of the combining entities in M&A transactions. We find that acquirers obtain a larger share
of the total M&A gains if the value of the target is less visible for outside investors confirming
the bargaining power hypothesis (H2c). High target information asymmetry allows the bidders to
gain an information advantage in the M&A process that can be exploited in price negotiations.
In addition, acquirer asymmetric information is found to have a significantly negative impact in
both panels. As such, bidders earn the highest fraction of gains if the targets are characterized by
high information asymmetry, while their own value is clearer for outside investors.
D. Robustness Checks
We perform additional tests to assess the robustness of our findings. First, to distinguish
between the effects of information asymmetry/uncertainty and relative scarcity, we follow Ahern
(2012) by adding the industry concentration of both the target and the acquirer as additional
control variables in our models. We rely on eight firm concentration ratios as reported by the
US Census Bureau to measure industry concentration.8 In addition, Faccio and Masulis (2005)
8 We use figures from the 2002 US Census Bureau report similar to what we did for industry value added.
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and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) argue that a potential change in control could discourage
controlling shareholders of acquiring firms from paying through stock swaps. Therefore, we
control for the ownership stake of the largest target and acquirer’s shareholders (gathered through
Thomson Institutional Ownership Database). As industry and ownership concentration are only
available for 1,266 of 1,725 transactions, we do not include these variables in the main models, but
the results are available upon request. Neither the target’s and acquirer’s industry concentration
nor their largest shareholder stake plays a significant role in determining the method of payment
or the wealth effects. More importantly, prior conclusions regarding the impact of target and
acquirer information asymmetry and uncertainty remain valid.
Next, we also use alternative abnormal return calculations. We consider longer event windows
([–5, +5] and [–10, +10]) and apply alternative techniques to calculate expected returns. We use
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, for which the factors (i.e., market excess returns,
the small minus big market capitalization factor, and the high minus low book equity/market
equity factor) are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website. We also estimate a four-factor
model including Carhart’s (1997) momentum returns. Finally, we compute industry-adjusted
returns as the difference between the actual returns and the industry raw return (Kolari and
Pynnönen, 2010). We use the 48 value-weighted Fama-French industry portfolios (Fama and
French, 1997) to determine industry returns. The resulting average cumulative abnormal returns
are found to be comparable across the different methodologies. Over the three-day event window
surrounding the announcement, we find a significant cumulative abnormal return of –1.68%
(24.81%) for the acquiring (target) firm’s shareholders when using the market model, while
this amounts to –1.44% (24.98%) for the three-factor model, –1.45% (24.97%) for the four-
factor model, and –1.60% (24.71%) when using industry-adjusted returns. The results of the
multivariate regressions (not reported) indicate that our findings are robust to these alternative
specifications.
Finally, we also recognize that the endogenous nature of one of our asymmetric information
proxies, namely the extent of analyst coverage, could potentially induce a self-selection bias
in our models. This selection problem could result from financial analysts preferring to cover
certain types of firms. These observable, as well as latent, firm characteristics could also impact
the value that is being created in M&A transactions. We control for such a potential bias using
the approach of Chang et al. (2006), Doukas et al. (2005), and Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis
(2008), who use multiple instrumental variables in a two-step regression model. In particular, we
focus on median industry coverage and S&P 500 inclusion as instruments for analyst coverage.
Higher analyst coverage is expected in industries that are typically better covered by analysts
and for firms that are included in the S&P 500, while no specific relation with M&A properties
is anticipated.9 The results of these two-stage instrumental variable probit and least squares
regressions are presented in Appendix C. The first stage regressions indicate that S&P inclusion
is significant in explaining target and acquirer analyst coverage, while relative acquirer analyst
coverage is also found to be positively related to the median analyst coverage in the industry. We
also notice that the null hypothesis of exogeneity can only be rejected for the two stage regression
9 Yu (2008) proposes a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression with expected coverage based on changes in the size of
brokerage houses, measured by their number of employees, as the instrumental variable. The size of a brokerage house
typically depends upon changes in its own revenue and is unlikely to be related to the M&A properties of a particular
firm that it covers. We also followed Yu’s (2008) procedure with 1993 as our benchmark year and obtained similar
findings. The disadvantage of this methodology is that firms need to be covered in the benchmark year in order to be able
to calculate the expected coverage. We are left with only 226 observations for which we have both target and acquirer
expected coverage. Given this relatively low number of observations, we do not report these regression models in the
paper, but they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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of acquirer relative returns (at the 5% level). While the impact of the instrumented relative
acquirer analyst coverage and the interaction with the stock payment dummy in the second stage
regression support our earlier conclusions (H3), the coefficient of relative target analyst coverage
is not found to be significant (although borderline with a p-value of 0.117 in the two stage probit
regression).10,11
E. Economic Drivers behind the Hypotheses
We explicitly test the assumptions made in the development of some of our hypotheses. H2 relies
on the notion that target information asymmetry negatively affects its bargaining strength in M&A
transactions. We consider three proxies for target negotiation power that have been used in the prior
literature. First, if multiple bidders are interested, targets are expected to have a stronger bargaining
position as rivalry among the bidding firms is likely to drive up offer prices and lead to better deal
terms (Eckbo, 2009). We analyze a dummy variable capturing whether at least one rival offer has
been made, as well as the actual number of rival bidders. In addition, we assume acquirers to have
a stronger bargaining position if they succeed in negotiating an M&A agreement where targets
have to pay a premium when they would later withdraw their consent (Officer, 2003), especially
if acquirers achieve this without having to accept upon a similar acquirer-payable termination
fee. Moreover, Heitzman (2011) suggests an intuitive way of capturing target bargaining power.
He argues that acquisitions initiated by acquiring firms signal a stronger negotiating position
for target shareholders compared to deals in which targets put themselves up for sale. Following
Heitzman (2011) and Masulis and Simsir (2015), we carefully analyze all actions taken by both
parties during the M&A process through the background documents that are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We performed this search for the 200 largest deals
in our sample and were able to identify the initiating party in 117 transactions, 19.66% of which
were target initiated. The correlation coefficients presented in Table IX confirm that our indices
capturing target information asymmetry are negatively related to a target’s bargaining power.
Although not all proxies are significantly related to each of the measures for bargaining power,
all individual asymmetric information proxies are significantly associated with at least one of our
bargaining constructs. Smaller targets and targets with lower analyst coverage are less likely to
receive offers by multiple bidders. Acquisitions of targets characterized by higher analyst forecast
errors and dispersion are more likely to be target initiated. Lower coverage of targets in the media
is associated with the existence of target-only termination fees. The index capturing all proxies
of asymmetric information (Index 2) demonstrates that more opaque targets are less likely to
incite rival offers and are more inclined to accept termination fees without a similar concession
by the bidding companies. In general, given all of these associations, we are confident that our
proxies for information asymmetry are correlated with the bargaining power of the target versus
the bidder in the M&A process.12
Additionally, H3 builds upon the argument that overvalued bidders characterized by high
information asymmetry/uncertainty purchase less overvalued targets. We examine whether our
empirical proxies are related to relative acquirer versus target misvaluation by following the
10 Concerning the interaction term, we follow Wooldridge (2002) who argues that the most natural choice of instrument
for this additional potential endogenous variable is the interaction between the instruments for relative acquirer coverage
and the stock payment dummy (Bun and Harrison, 2014).
11 We test whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term through Sargan’s χ ² test statistic. As it is found to
be insignificant, we can conclude that our instruments are not invalid.
12 The only surprising and conflicting finding is that lower analyst coverage is found to be associated with a reduced
likelihood of target-only termination fees.
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Table IX. Correlation Between Proxies for Information Asymmetry and
Uncertainty and Measures of Bargaining Power and Relative Misvaluation
This table reports the pairwise correlation coefficients between our measures of target information asym-
metry and our proxies for bargaining power (a dummy variable capturing whether rival bidders have been
identified, the number of rival bidders, a dummy capturing whether targets accept a termination fee, while
bidders do not, and a dummy that is equal to one for target initiated deals) and between our measures of
bidder information asymmetry/uncertainty and relative bidder versus target misvaluation. The following
proxies for information asymmetry are considered: Composite asymmetric information index 1 (composite
index including the inverse of normalized relative analyst coverage, normalized analyst forecast dispersion,
normalized analyst forecast error, and the inverse of normalized relative media coverage), composite asym-
metric information index 2 (composite index including the inverse of normalized relative analyst coverage,
normalized analyst forecast dispersion, normalized analyst forecast error, the inverse of normalized relative
media coverage, and normalized firm size), the inverse of firm size, the inverse of relative analyst coverage
(number of financial analysts/firm size), analyst forecast error (absolute value of the difference between
median EPS estimate and actual value/stock price), analyst forecast dispersion (standard deviation EPS/stock
price), and the inverse of relative media coverage (number of Factiva articles in pre-M&A year/firm size).
The degree of uncertainty is captured by implied and idiosyncratic stock return volatility as well as a













−0.038 −0.043 0.022 0.069
(0.197) (0.149) (0.469) (0.477)
Composite target asymmetric
information index 2
−0.072∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ −0.071
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.465)
Inverse of target size −0.147∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ 0.027 −0.097
(0.000) (0.000) (0.258) (0.297)
Inverse of relative target analyst
coverage
−0.037 −0.041∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.109
(0.126) (0.091) (0.038) (0.243)
Target analyst forecast error −0.014 −0.014 0.020 0.192∗∗
(0.624) (0.603) (0.462) (0.045)
Target analyst forecast dispersion −0.019 −0.022 −0.009 0.207∗∗
(0.528) (0.462) (0.758) (0.030)
Inverse of relative target media
coverage
−0.005 −0.001 0.046∗ 0.071
(0.834) (0.962) (0.056) (0.448)









Inverse of acquirer size 0.205∗∗∗
(0.000)
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Table IX. Correlation Between Proxies for Information Asymmetry and
















Acquirer implied volatility 0.155∗∗∗
(0.000)
Acquirer idiosyncratic volatility 0.129∗∗∗
(0.001)
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
procedure developed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). They compare a firm’s equity value in the
market with its true value estimated through a linear function of accounting information and a
vector of conditional accounting multiples. The proposed model links the market value of equity
to the book value of equity, net income, and leverage as follows:
LN(MV)i t = α0 j t + α1 j t LN(BV)i t + α2 j t LN(NI)i t + α3 j t I(<0)LN(NI)i t
+α4 j t LEVi t + εi t . (1)
where LN(MV)it is natural logarithm of the market value of equity for firm i in year t; LN(BV)it
is natural logarithm of the book value of equity for firm i in year t; LN(NI)it is natural logarithm
of the absolute value of net income for firm i in year t; I(<0)LN(NI)it is an indicator variable for
negative net income interacted with the natural logarithm of the absolute value of net income for
firm i in year t; and LEVit is leverage ratio for firm i in year t.
The indicator function I(<0)LN(NI)it allows firms with negative net income to enter the regres-
sion even though it is estimated in logarithms. This cross-sectional model is estimated for each
industry j and each year t separately.
Following Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), we group all Compustat firms in 12 Fama and French
industries, as presented on Kenneth French’s website.13 The extent of firm-specific misvaluation
is proxied by the firm’s deviation from the valuation implied by the sector valuation multiples
αkjt (with k = 0, . . . , 4) calculated as in Equation (1). Finally, we explore the difference between
acquirer and target misvaluation (scaled by size) in order to capture the relative misvaluation
of acquirer versus target. The correlations in Table IX demonstrate that our indices of acquirer
information asymmetry (second asymmetric information index, inverse of acquirer size and
inverse of media coverage) and all uncertainty proxies are positively associated with the extent
of relative acquirer versus target misvaluation.
13 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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IV. Conclusions
A double-sided problem of asymmetric information and uncertainty arises in M&A transactions
as the values of both the target and the acquirer are uncertain and information may be unevenly
distributed. In this paper, we explore the consequences of limited information availability and
uncertainty and the strategic exploitation of information advantages by investigating the payment
consideration, as well as the wealth effects, in a sample of 1,725 acquisition announcements of
public targets and 1,810 announcements of private targets from 1994 to 2011.
We illustrate differing effects for target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the type of
payment offered to target shareholders. In line with the risk-sharing hypothesis, acquisitions of
target firms characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock offers.
Alternatively, higher target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of cash payments. We
argue that rational bidders have incentives to offer cash in acquisitions of more informationally
opaque targets as they expect to realize higher gains and avoid sharing these gains with the
target shareholders. Our empirical results confirm that bidders realize higher announcement
returns and earn a larger fraction of total gains if the targets are affected by higher information
asymmetry. These higher gains stem from stronger bargaining power of the bidders in these types
of transactions. We also find evidence of a positive association between our measures of target
information asymmetry and several proxies for a bidder’s negotiation power in M&A transactions.
Our results also demonstrate that the difficulty in estimating the buyer’s real value incites
market-timing behavior through a higher incidence of stock swaps. The extent of information
asymmetry and uncertainty in the acquirer’s value is found to be positively related to the relative
misvaluation of the acquirer versus the target firm. Accordingly, the typically more negative stock
price reaction upon the announcement of stock offers is found to be stronger for more opaque
bidders.
Finally, we find that these forces do not offset each other, but instead act together, leading to
a fraction of 62.90% cash offers if the target information asymmetry ranks in the top tercile,
while that of bidder lies in the bottom tercile, compared to 31.43% in the reverse situation. In
addition, we find that only 16.47% use cash if both target and acquirer are part of the top tercile
of uncertainty.
Our findings may have important implications for academia, as well as practice. Our results add
to the available literature concerning information constraints and illustrate opportunities for the
strategic use of superior information. In addition, we provide additional insights in the antecedents
of the payment consideration in M&A transactions demonstrating that rational bidders take
into account the expected value creation through the M&A when they decide upon the type of
payment. Furthermore, our results confirm the importance of differentiating between asymmetric
information and symmetric uncertainty that affects all market participants. Finally, investigating
these issues in other geographic settings, especially in cross-border M&As where the impact
of information asymmetry is likely to be higher, may constitute interesting avenues for future
research.
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Appendix A: Definitions of Explanatory Variables
This table presents an overview of the detailed definitions of the various explanatory variables included
across the different tables in the paper.
Explanatory Variable Definition
Proxies for information asymmetry
Composite asymmetric
information index 1
Composite index including the inverse of normalized relative analyst
coverage, normalized analyst forecast dispersion, normalized analyst
forecast error, and the inverse of normalized relative media coverage.
Composite asymmetric
information index 2
Composite index including the inverse of normalized relative analyst
coverage, normalized analyst forecast dispersion, normalized analyst
forecast error, the inverse of normalized relative media coverage, and
normalized firm size.
Relative analyst coverage Number of financial analyst recommendations for the last month of the
fiscal year preceding the M&A announcement scaled by firm size.
Analyst forecast error Absolute value of the difference between the median EPS estimate and
the actual value/stock price (final month of the fiscal year preceding
the M&A announcement).
Analyst forecast dispersion Standard deviation in earnings-per-share (EPS) estimates/stock price
(final month of the fiscal year preceding the M&A announcement).
Relative media coverage Number of Factiva articles in pre-M&A year scaled by firm size.
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets (pre-M&A year)
Proxies for uncertainty
Composite uncertainty index Composite index including implied and idiosyncratic stock return
volatility.
Implied volatility Median daily implied volatility from 80 days until 51 days before the
M&A announcement (average between the ATM call and the ATM put
options).
Idiosyncratic volatility Standard deviation of the market-adjusted residuals of daily stock returns
during a 200-day estimation window (250 days until 51 days before the
announcement).
Control variables
Target size/Acquirer size Target size divided by acquirer size (pre-M&A year).
Stock Dummy equal to one for full stock offers.
Tender offer Dummy equal to one for tender offers.
Hostile offer Dummy equal to one for hostile offers.
Industry-related offer Dummy equal to one for industry-related offers (four-digit US SIC level).
Toehold Stake in the target firm held by the acquirer before the acquisition offer.
M/B Market-to-book ratio of equity (pre-M&A year).
Cash ratio Cash and cash equivalents/total assets (pre-M&A year).
Debt ratio Total debt/total assets (pre-M&A year).
Profitability EBITDA/total assets (pre-M&A year).
R&D R&D expenses/total assets (pre-M&A year).
S&P dummy Dummy equal to one for firms included in the S&P 500.
Industry value added Industry value added/total output (using IO industry codes in 2002 Use
and Make tables of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis).




Median financial analyst recommendations in a four-digit US SIC
industry (pre-M&A year).
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